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NOTES
SIMILAR HARM MEANS SIMILAR CLAIMS: DOING
AWAY WITH DAVIS V. BANDEMER's DISCRIMINATORY
EFFECr REQUIREMENT IN POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING CASES
INTRODUCTION
Voter apathy is rampant in the United States, arguably due, in
part, to individuals' inability to elect representatives they believe
will serve their interests. Districting schemes employed by the
political party in power are one of the many mechanisms in our
political system that perpetuate voter frustration. Bizarre looking
districts are drawn by both political parties following each decenni-
al census to preserve their domination at the polls. These politically
gerrymandered districts lead to the maintenance of the interests of
the force in power to the detriment of the will of the majority.'
What follows is "reduced voter participation, reduced willingness to
support government, and reduced quality of governance." This is
due to the fact that "[i]f a particular rule works to the systematic
disadvantage of one group over another, members of that disadvan-
taged group are less likely to think the rules, and any policies
produced by them, are legitimate."3
'" See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Draw-
ing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 588, 588 (1993) ("Redis-
tricting is politics pure, fraught with the capacity for self-dealing and cynical manipula-
tion:).
2 Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND
THE CoURTS 212, 213 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
' Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives on Davis v. Bandemer Views of the Practitioner, The-
orist, and Reformer, in PoLrICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 117, 132 (Bernard
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This result is contrary to our system of democracy, which
purports to represent the will of the majority while giving special
attention to minority concerns, a system which boasts promises of
the electorate's ability to change the composition of government to
better serve its interests. Politically gerrymandered districts "create
a sense of disenfranchisement . . . that one's territory is unrepre-
sented."4  It would seem this result would be closely scruti-
nized by the judiciary, and plans subversive to the majority would
be struck down. However, recent Supreme Court decisions have
left it nearly impossible to invalidate a politically gerrymandered
district.
To strike down a district as an unconstitutional political gerry-
mander, plaintiffs must demonstrate both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect on the part of the legislature that designed the
district.5 This test is impossible to meet because discriminatory
intent may not only be presumed in the partisan context, it is in
fact permissible.6 Discriminatory effect, however, requires evidence
that claimants have less opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect candidates of their choice. The extensive
protections afforded voting rights today make it unlikely this result
will be realized.8 Thus, while allowing districts to be drawn by
partisans in a partisan manner without a meaningful check may not
literally disenfranchise the majority will, it does effectively exclude
the majority's interests from representation at all levels of govern-
ment.
The test to invalidate a district as a political gerrymander
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
differs from that necessary to strike down a district as a racial
gerrymander. In Shaw v. Reno,9 the Court held that racially gerry-
mandered districts can be invalidated by a showing of discriminato-
Grofman ed., 1990).
4 Id.
' See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding a showing of both discrimi-
natory intent and effect necessary to invalidate a district as an unconstitutional political
gerrymander); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that only discriminatory intent
need be demonstrated to invalidate a district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander).
" See Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) ("It would be idle, we think, to contend
that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is
sufficient to invalidate it." (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752-53 (1973))).
. See id. at 133.
See The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-1973e (1994).
9. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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ry intent alone." Discriminatory intent is established by proving a
district was drawn with the purpose of creating a racial classifica-
tion."
Constituents of both politically and racially gerrymandered
districts suffer representational harm. Therefore, the requirement
of showing discriminatory effect in political gerrymandering cases
should be eliminated, and the test to invalidate these two types of
districts should be the same. Representational harm is the injury
suffered by a group when it is placed into a majority-minority
district where it is not a member of the group the district was
created to benefit. The resulting injury is that representatives elect-
ed from these districts ignore the interests of the citizens who are
not members of the minority group the district was intended to
benefit. The representatives believe they have been elected only to
serve members of the district's dominant minority group. 3
The Court has refused to acknowledge the application of rep-
resentational harm in the political gerrymandering context. 4 How-
ever, it may be argued that representational harm is present in that
context, and the injuries suffered by individuals in both politically
and racially gerrymandered districts are the same.
Meaningful representation cannot be attained until a uniform
test for these two claims is established and politically gerryman-
dered districts can be declared invalid. Until this is accomplished,
it will remain impossible for any group, majority or minority, to
elect legislators who are truly committed to representing the inter-
ests of the people who have elected them. Effective representation
of interests will arguably lead to a corresponding increase in confi-
dence and satisfaction with our political system.
. See id. at 649.
"" See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (1996).
'z Representational harm was identified in Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648:
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common inter-
ests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their prima-
ry obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their con-
stituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative
democracy.
Id.
" See id. The Court described the message sent by a racial gerrymander as not only
the perpetuation of racial stereotypes, but also that elected representatives of racially ger-
rymandered districts must represent only members of the minority group the district was
created to benefit, to the detriment of other constituents' concerns. See id.
"' See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (stating that "[w]e cannot presume . . .
without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the in-
terests of those voters").
619
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This Note argues the necessity of eliminating the element of
discriminatory effect from claims of political gerrymandering. As
such, an extensive analysis of the development of the tests of dis-
criminatory intent and effect in both racial and political gerryman-
dering claims is necessary, and accomplished in Part I. Part II of
this Note discusses the notion of representational harm and sug-
gests that it is applicable in both the racial and political gerryman-
dering contexts. Part I argues that in light of the similarity of the
resulting harm in these cases, the element of discriminatory effect
should be eliminated from claims of political gerrymandering, and
proof that a district is an unconstitutional political gerrymander
should turn on a showing of discriminatory legislative intent alone.
Finally, this Note will close with suggestions for merging the two
standards in future cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Early Redistricting Claims: How the Supreme Court Entered
the Gerrymandering Thicket
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,5 the Supreme Court opened the
door to the resolution of reapportionment claims. Plaintiffs, black
residents of the city of Tuskegee, challenged the constitutionality of
the "strangely irregular" twenty-eight sided district created by the
Alabama legislature out of the geographically square shaped city.' 6
Plaintiffs claimed the district was created in order to exclude black
voters from its boundaries, 7  thereby violating the Fifteenth
Amendment. i" The Court declared the district an unconstitutional
interference with the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. 9 It held that when a legislature "singles out a readily iso-
lated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treat-
ment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment ... The inescapable hu-
man effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil
15- 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
' Id. at 341.
'" See id. The manner in which the boundaries of the district were drawn had the ef-
fect of removing from the district "all save only four or five of [the city's] 400 Negro
voters while not removing a single white voter or resident." Id.
See id. Violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were also
asserted. See id. at 340.
" See id. at 346.
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colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore
enjoyed voting rights." 0
Subsequently, in Baker v. Carr,2 the Court held reapportion-
ment to be a justiciable question under a claim of violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Shortly
after its decision in Carr, the Court then developed the "one per-
son, one vote" standard in Reynolds v. Sims.' This standard held
that equipopulous districts are required under the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 The Court reasoned, "an individual's right to vote
for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight
is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of
citizens living in other parts of the State.2'2
This backdrop of early reapportionment litigation set the stage
for the schism that developed between political and racial gerry-
mandering cases and the disparate tests of discriminatory intent26
versus discriminatory intent and effect27
2" Id. at 346-47. This was a departure from Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
in which the Court held malapportionment issues to be nonjusticiable. In Colegrove, the
district in question was challenged under a claim of vote dilution, as opposed to disen-
franchisement. See id. at 550; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing
the difference in these claims). After Gomillion, however, the Court found it had opened
itself up to resolution of these claims, despite the warnings of Justice Frankfurter that
"[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket." Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2L See id. at 197.
-- 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Although at this point the Court had confined itself to reso-
lution of claims of unequal district population, and stayed away from the question of
whether districts drawn solely for racial or political purposes were justiciable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
24. See id. at 568.
' Id. However, the Court noted that while the Equal Protection Clause "requires that
a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal
population as is practicable . . . [m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a work-
able constitutional requirement." Id- at 577.
' Necessary to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering brought under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
27. Necessary to establish a claim of political gerrymandering. See Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
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B. Racial Gerrymandering
1. Early Cases and Tests Based on Challenges Under the Voting
Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause
Districts are challenged as illegal racial gerrymanders under
the Voting Rights Act of 196528 and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 The Voting Rights Act of 1965
was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Fifteenth
Amendment which provides that the right to vote "shall not be
denied or abridged ... on account of race, color or previous con-
dition of servitude."3 Until recently, its enactment had the effect
of shifting the arena from which these claims were brought from
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to violations of the Act itself and the Fifteenth
Amendment.3 Although this Note's focus assesses the proper
standards to be applied in deciding reapportionment claims under
the Equal Protection Clause, an understanding of litigation under
the Voting Rights Act is instructive.
a. The Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act of 196532 sought to equalize African-
American and white voting strength by eliminating exclusionary
measures such as literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and good char-
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-1973e (1994).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. This power is enforced by § 5, which states, "The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this ar-
ticle." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5.
" See Scott E. Blissman, Note, Navigating the Political Thicket: The Supreme Court,
the Department of Justice, and the "Predominant Motive" in District Apportionment Cases
after Miller v. Johnson, 5 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 503, 512 (1996). While gerrymandering
claims are brought under each of these distinct theories, it should be observed that the
interplay between the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment is itself unique.
The Voting Rights Act itself has been challenged as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). This is because compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act could require the creation of majority-minority districts, a classification based on race.
See Blissman, supra, at 516. In United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 144, the State
of New York created majority-minority districts which divided the Hasidic Jewish commu-
nity between two districts. The Court upheld the districting plan and rejected plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge, stating "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment man-
dates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and apportionment." Id. at
161. This holding was overruled by Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973a-1973e (1994).
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acter provisos, employed by states to prevent blacks from voting.33
These invidious tactics were utilized by states after the enactment
of the Fifteenth Amendment and evidenced that a "number of
states... refused to take no for an answer and continued to cir-
cumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition [against disenfran-
chisement] through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments,
perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination."'34
Section 5 of the Rights Act outlines preclearance measures
states must follow in redrawing district boundaries.35 Section 5 has
"- See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (stating the Act's
goal as to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century"); see also Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 639 (1993) (documenting the list of oppressive tactics employed by states
to prevent blacks from voting).
' Shaw, 509 U.S. at 639 (quoting James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race
Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights
Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 637 (1983)).
-1 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Section 5 requires
states to submit a new districting plan, or any other proposed changes regarding voting
qualifications or prerequisites, to the Attorney General for approval, or seek a declaratory
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that holds a
proposed districting plan valid:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions
set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under
the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or
seek to administer any voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force
or effect on November 1, 1964 . . such State or subdivision may institute an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a
declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race ... [p]rovided, [tihat such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced
without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate
official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission,
or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days
after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such
objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney
General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to
object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subse-
quent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure.
Id. The requirements of § 5 ensure compliance with the provisions of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which requires new voting practices not result in the "denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C § 1973(a) (1994).
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been interpreted to prohibit retrogression of racial minorities' posi-
tions with respect to their exercise of voting rights.36
The Voting Rights Act effectively eradicated many of the
invidious measures aimed at disenfranchising minorities. 7 In re-
sponse to the Voting Rights Act, however, the white majority
began employing new and more subtle gerrymandering techniques
to prevent minorities from fully exercising their voting strength.38
These measures did not result in the literal disenfranchisement of
minorities at the polls, but instead strategically diluted their voting
power by placing them into carefully crafted districts designed to
minimize the impact of their vote.39 As these measures became in-
creasingly prevalent, challenges to racially gerrymandered districts
began to change focus from denial of the electoral franchise, to
claims of minority vote dilution as the Court began to recognize
that "the right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting pow-
er as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."'
' See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). In Beer, the Court upheld a
New Orleans districting plan which resulted in blacks' holding majorities in two out of
five city districts; they previously held majorities in none. See id. at 141-42. The plan
was challenged under the theory of vote dilution because it did not permit blacks to elect
representatives in proportion to their representation in the city's population. See id. at 136.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held the plan actually strengthened the voting
power of racial minorities by increasing the number of minorities elected to office, and
therefore could not be said to have the effect of diluting voting power. See id. at 141-42.
. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (describing the Act's effect of in-
creasing voter registration among minorities, thereby decreasing the statistical disparity be-
tween white and black voter registration).
'- See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and
Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1525 n.31 (1994)
(giving a laundry list of such invidious tactics: "Stacking" large numbers of minority vot-
ers into single districts where slightly larger white majorities could outvote the minority
population; "packing" minorities into single districts, creating a supermajority in one dis-
trict to ensure the absence of minorities from other districts; "cracking" a minority's ma-
jority by splitting them into different districts).
. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy after All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 289 (1996) (describing the difference between disen-
franchisement and vote dilution claims: disenfranchisement occurs when an individual is
literally denied the right to vote, and is effectuated by invidious measures such as poll
taxes and literacy tests, while dilution occurs when the votes of one group are made to
count less than the votes of others through manipulation of district boundaries).
* Shaw, 509 U.S. at 640-41 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
569 (1969)); see also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1094 (1991) (stating that
voting rights litigation shifted from ensuring access to the ballot, to assuring that minori-
ties' votes were "meaningful").
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In City of Mobile v. Bolden,4 the Court established the dual
test of requiring plaintiffs to prove both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect for a district to be declared invalid as a racial
gerrymander in claims brought under the Voting Rights Act. 2 The
decision in City of Mobile was criticized for making a claim of
racial gerrymandering nearly impossible to establish, and led, ulti-
mately, to the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. 3 The
1982 amendments eliminated the requirement of establishing dis-
criminatory intent; a violation of the Act could be shown by proof
of discriminatory effect alone."
Shortly after its decision in City of Mobile, the Court analyzed
the 1982 amendments in Thornburg v. Gingles4 The Court first
. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
See id. at 62. In City of Mobile, plaintiffs claimed that Alabama's voting plan di-
luted black voting strength because blacks had been unable to elect minority candidates to
office. See id. at 71-74. The Court, however, refused to invalidate the plan because plain-
tiffs failed to establish the legislature's discriminatory intent. See id. at 77-80 (describing
how discriminatory intent cannot be inferred from a non-proportional representation of mi-
norities in the city government).
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994)).
•'* See id.
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting oi standard, practice, or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color. . . .
Id.; see Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE LJ. 105, 143-44 n.231 (1992) (arguing that
when § 2 was amended, Congress felt that proof of discriminatory intent had never been
an element of a racial gerrymandering claim). The 1982 "amendment 'restate[d] Congress'
earlier intent that violations of the Voting Rights Act, including section 2, could be es-
tablished by showing the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice."' Miller, supra,
at 144 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. RP. No. 97-227, at 29 (1981)).
" 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Plaintiffs in Thornburg challenged North Carolina's redistrict-
ing scheme, alleging that it constituted an impairment of the ability of black voters to
elect representatives of their choice. See id. at 35. The violation was accomplished by the
enactment of multi-member districts as opposed to single-member districts. See id. With
single member districts, blacks would have held several majorities. See id. at 38.
At this point it is instructive to define some of the terminology used in this Note.
Multi-member districts are districts where more than one member is elected to represent
the constituency. Single-member districts are those districts which elect only one represen-
tative. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 589-90. Multi-member or at-large
election districts result in greater injury to minority voters who do not make up a voting
majority in that particular district. See id. For example, if five seats are open in an elec-
tion in a multi-member district, the white majority will be able to elect all five
representatives. See id. "[Tihe perceived harm is the capacity of a majority community to
capture a disproportionate share of representation through its ability to vote serially for
each candidate for local office." Id.
6251998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
found that the 1982 amendments obviated the necessity of showing
both discriminatory intent and effect in order to prove a claim of
racial gerrymandering.' The Court went on to establish a new
three-pronged standard by which claims of minority vote dilution
in racial gerrymandering cases were to be analyzed:47
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to consti-
tute a majority in a single-member district.... Second, the
minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive.... Third, the minority must be able to demon-
strate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as
the minority candidate running unopposed ... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.'
The Court held that discriminatory effect is shown, rendering a
district an illegal gerrymander, when the existence of a voting bloc
majority that is usually able to defeat candidates supported by a
politically cohesive minority group, is demonstrated.49 The Court
noted that claims of vote dilution will not be established by show-
ing the complaining group failed to win in one particular elec-
tion;50 rather, such dilution must be established over time." The
Court also held that discriminatory effects can be shown by evi-
dence that minorities prefer the same candidates at the polls and
that white voters will generally vote as a cohesive bloc to defeat a
minority candidate.52
' See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35.
7 See id. at 50-51.
I d.
. See id. at 49.
. See id. at 57. Conversely, the Court noted that in "a district where elections are
shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one
or a few individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the district
experiences legally significant bloc voting." Id.
"' See id. The Court, however, was unable to determine the number of elections that
must be looked at to determine if racially polarized voting occurred, and stated that this
factor would vary depending on the circumstances. See id. at 57 n.25.
S- See id. at 56. The Court ultimately concluded plaintiffs had proven racial bloc vot-
ing, and thus, discriminatory effect of the North Carolina plan. See id. at 80. In 16 previ-
ous primary and general elections, black support for black candidates had been unwaver-
ing, and there had been little cross-over by white voters in voting for minority candidates.
See id. at 59. Black support for black candidates ranged between 87% and 96% in gener-
al elections, and between 71% and 92% in 11 of the primaries. See id. However, white
support for black candidates ranged only between 28% and 49% in general elections, and
(Vol. 48:617
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The 3-prong Thornburg test was next applied in Growe v.
Emison,5 3 in which Minnesota plaintiffs claimed minority vote di-
lution under a single-member district plan. 4 The Court held the
Thornburg test was not satisfied because plaintiffs failed to show
sufficient discriminatory effects through statistical or anecdotal evi-
dence of political cohesion or majority bloc voting.5 The Court
emphasized that vote dilution cannot be assumed, but must be
proved by specific facts. 6
More recently, in Johnson v. De Grady," the Court modified
the test set forth in Thornburg to require a "totality of circumstanc-
es" analysis in establishing whether a districting plan has the nec-
essary effect of causing minority vote dilution. 8 Under the test,
the focus shifts away from the necessity of producing evidence of
specific racial voting bloc behavior. To establish the requisite dis-
criminatory effects, and strike down a district as an illegal racial
gerrymander, evidence of more general discriminatory practices
must be produced 9
between 8% and 50% in primary elections. See id. Additionally, in general multicandidate
elections, black candidates were consistently ranked last or next to last by white voters,
except in predominately Democratic areas where black candidates were usually ranked last
among Democratic candidates, "if not last or next to last among all candidates." Id. Based
on these findings, the Court concluded plaintiffs had shown existence of discriminatory ef-
fect and struck down the plan. See id. at 80.
' 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
See id. at 27.
See id. at 41. The Court's criticism of plaintiffs' offer of proof was that it con-
tained no concrete statistical data on which to rest its assertion, and further, was accepted
by the lower court as a "national phenomenon that is 'all but inevitable."' Id. (quoting
Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act-Recognizing the
Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 COLUM. L. R'V. 1615, 1625 (1983)). Later that
year the Court decided Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), in which the Court
again found the Thornburg test not satisfied when plaintiffs claimed minority vote dilution
under the Voting Rights Act. The Court stressed again that the existence of majority-mi-
nority districts was not a per se violation: These districts do not "invariably minimize or
maximize voting strength" Il at 154. Rather, specific discriminatory effects must be dem-
onstrated. See id. at 155. Since there was no evidence that the white majority actually en-
gaged in bloc voting, the Court held "it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters
to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters:' Id.
See Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-41.
" 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
See id. at 1011.
See Matthew W. Dietz, Comment, Equal Electoral Opportunity: The Supreme Court
Reevaluates the Use of Race in Redistricting in Johnson v. De Grady, 3 J.L. & POL'Y
497, 499 (1995) (stating that discriminatory practices became the new focus of the Court
under Johnson v. De Grady as opposed to past practices of looking strictly at voting be-
havior).
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b. Equal Protection Violations
Racially gerrymandered districts are also challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The injury
typically alleged by plaintiffs in equal protection claims is vote
dilution, as opposed to disenfranchisement. The Court's early reso-
lution of these claims required a showing of both discriminatory
intent and discriminatory effect in order to invalidate a district as
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In cases decided prior to
Shaw v. Reno," the Court routinely held that plaintiffs failed to
state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, as the discrimina-
tory effect of denial of the opportunity to participate in the politi-
cal process could never be demonstrated.6'
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,62 one of the earliest cases alleging a
district to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, residents of
two Indiana counties challenged a districting scheme which estab-
lished one county as a multi-member district for the election of
representatives to the state house and senate.' The plaintiffs
claimed the plan diluted the votes of blacks living in the "ghetto
area" of the county.' The Court upheld the plan because discrimi-
. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Shaw was the first case in which the Court held that a ra-
cial gerrymandering claim had been stated under the Equal Protection Clause. See id.
"- See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding that plaintiffs failed to
state a claim when bringing malapportionment claim). But see White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973). White was one early aberrational case in which the Court found a Texas
reapportionment plan unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plan was held
to dilute the voting strength of minorities by placing them into multi-member districts. See
id. at 769-70. Discriminatory effects of the reapportionment scheme were demonstrated un-
der a "totality of circumstances" test. See id. Plaintiffs provided evidence that Texas his-
torically engaged in official racial discrimination and was presently employing electoral
mechanisms in the primary process which prevented blacks from securing candidacy. See
id. at 766-67. Because specific tactics employed by the State of Texas could be pointed
to which had the effect of denying minorities access to the political process, the holding
in White was unique. In addition, Professor Issacharoff argues that despite the fact the
Court in White was able to point to specific practices in the primary process which re-
suited in limiting blacks' access to the political arena, the offer of proof was flawed be-
cause, among other things, the Court was "unable to specify which functional components
of such elections were objectionable." Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Politi-
cal Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1833,
1844 (1992). White's totality of circumstances test was overruled by City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which reinstated a more rigorous test for proving discrimina-
tory consequences of reapportionment plans.
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
'- See id. at 128-29. For a discussion of why multi-member districts result in greater
potential for minority vote dilution than single-member districts, see Aleinikoff &
Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 589-90 and supra note 44.
- See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 148-49. Plaintiffs alleged the plan was discriminatory
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natory effects had not been demonstrated.65 No evidence had been
presented, the Court reasoned, that black voters "had less oppor-
tunity than did other... residents to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice."
The Court also refused to find a constitutional violation in
United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey.67 The redistricting
plan at issue in that case split the community's Hasidic Jewish
population into two separate districts to provide for two minority
dominated districts, in compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.' The Court found no violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment, as neither "mandates any per se rule against using
racial factors in districting and apportionment." The Court also
emphasized that because white-majority districts had been preserved
in other parts of the state, the plaintiffs had not suffered dilution of
their voting strength."
3. Shaw v. Reno and Beyond
It was against this backdrop of litigation that the Court decided
Shaw v. Reno.7' In Shaw, the Court, for the first time, held that
the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
in a racial gerrymandering claim. However, the claim was an "ana-
lytically distinct" one, whereby the injury alleged was neither
because the ghetto population was underrepresented. The proportion of elected legislators
who lived in the ghetto was less than "the ghetto's proportion of the population, less than
the proportion of legislators elected from Washington Township, a less populous district,
and less than the ghetto would likely have elected had the county consisted of single-
member districts." Id.
" See id. at 160.
Id. at 149. The Court focused on the absence of evidence that ghetto residents
were not allowed to register to vote, or were denied the opportunity to vote or participate
in political party activities such as slating of candidates. See id. at 149-50. The Court
concluded that "the failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its pop-
ulations emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor
Negroes." Id. at 153.
" 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
See id. at 144, 157.
6" Id. at 161.
' See id. at 166-68. The Court reasoned that as long as the whites were provided
fair representation no grounds existed for a claim of denial of the electoral franchise on
the basis of race. See id. at 166.
71. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
' Id. at 652. The Court distinguished the claim from that in UJO, which held dis-
tricts based on race by design did not result in a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment. See United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S. at 144. To distinguish the cases,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that plaintiffs' claim in Shaw was ana-
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disenfranchisement nor dilution, but rather resulted from a reappor-
tionment plan so grotesque in shape it "rationally [could not] ...
be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters
into different districts on the basis of race."73
In Shaw, North Carolina was granted an extra congressional
district as a result of the 1990 census.74 The State was redistrict-
ed, and the new plan, giving African-Americans a majority of
voters in the new district, was submitted to the Attorney General
for preclearance pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.75 The
Attorney General rejected this plan on the grounds that it was
possible to create a second majority-minority district within the
state.
76
A second plan, containing two majority-minority districts, was
submitted to the Attorney General. One of the newly created dis-
tricts stretched "approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 and,
for much of its length, [wa]s no wider than the 1-85 corridor."
The original plaintiffs, the North Carolina Republican Party,
claimed this district was an unconstitutional political gerryman-
der.7' This claim was dismissed, but later a second claim was
filed by a different group of plaintiffs challenging the district as a
racial gerrymander79
The Court established that the districting plan could be found,
on remand, to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander if it were
"so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally c[ould] be
viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard for traditional districting principles.... "
lytically distinct from that in United Jewish Organizations. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652.
The Shaw plaintiffs complained the reapportionment plan in question was "so irrational on
its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality," while the plaintiffs in
United Jewish Organizations had alleged a different cause of action: vote dilution. See id.
" Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649.
See id. at 633.
7' See id. at 633-34 (describing the state's voting population as 20% black and con-
stituting a majority in only five of North Carolina's 100 counties).
7& See id. at 633.
'" Id. at 630. Justice O'Connor noted that, "'[i]f you drove down the interstate with
both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district."' Id. at 636 (alteration
in original) (quoting Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Redistricting, WASH. POST,
Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).
- See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
79. See Shaw, 509 U.S. 630. In the second claim, plaintiffs were five residents of Dur-
ham County. See id. at 636.
'. Id. at 642; see id. at 647 (defining these principles as "compactness, contiguity,
and respect for political subdivisions").
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On remand, the State would have the burden of showing the nar-
row tailoring of the new districting plan and a compelling interest
for its creation."1
In its analysis of this claim, the Court expanded the notion of
harm inflicted by racial gerrymandering. Traditionally, racial gerry-
mandering cases focused on the harms of vote dilution and disen-
franchisement. Shaw added representational harm to this list. This
harm occurs because when a "district obviously is created solely to
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group,
elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obli-
gation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole. 82
What Shaw did not decide was whether an intentional creation
of majority-minority districts "'without more,' always gives rise to
an equal protection claim."83 Thus, the Court did not hold that a
showing of discriminatory intent alone would always be sufficient
to strike down a district as a racial gerrymander under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Subsequent cases have done little to clarify what exactly will
establish the necessary discriminatory intent called for by Shaw in
order to strike down a district as a racial gerrymander under the
Equal Protection Clause. For instance, the bizarre shape test of
Shaw was not followed in Miller v. Johnson.84 The Court instead
looked to see if race was the "predominant factor motivating" the
legislature in creating the challenged district. Under Miller, bi-
zarre shape may still be indicative of discriminatory intent, howev-
er, it is not a necessary condition. In departing from Shaw's bizarre
shape test, the Court in Miller attempted to broaden the evidence
which will demonstrate discriminatory legislative intent.86
See id. at 643-44.
82 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
I2. d at 649 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 668 (White, I., dissenting)).
'. 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down a redistricting plan created by the State of
Georgia which sought to create a majority-minority district of African-Americans by con-
necting metropolitan Atlanta with a county located 260 miles away).
See id. at 916.
" The Court stated: "The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legisla-
tive purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to
place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district." Id. In order
to prove race was the predominant motivating factor, "a plaintiff must prove that the leg-
islature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited
to compactuess, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by ac-
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While Miller's "predominant motivating factor test" attempted
to more broadly define standard set forth in Shaw, 7 most com-
mentators agree that Miller served only to confuse lower courts as
to what test should be applied to establish the necessary discrimi-
natory intent in order to invalidate a district as an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander."8
In the more recent cases of Bush v. Vera 9 and Shaw v.
Hunt' ("Shaw I/'), the Court further defined what constitutes a
showing of discriminatory intent. In Bush, the Court held unconsti-
tutional three newly created majority-minority districts under the
predominant motive test of Miller." The Court found race to have
been the predominant motivating factor behind the districts' cre-
ation as the evidence proved that racial data were the factors most
heavily relied on in the districts' formation.'e
In Shaw II,9 the Court struck down the North Carolina reap-
portionment plan first brought to the Court in Shaw v. Reno. Ap-
plying strict scrutiny, the Court stated that "drawing racial distinc-
tions is permissible where a governmental body is pursuing a
'compelling state interest."'94 However, the reapportionment plan
must be "'narrowly tailored to achieve [that] compelling inter-
est."'95 In addressing the element of discriminatory intent, the
Court held that "a racial classification cannot withstand strict scru-
tiny based upon speculation about what 'may have motivated' the
legislature. To be a compelling interest, the State must show that
the alleged objective was the legislature's 'actual purpose' for the
tual shared interests, to racial considerations." Id. However, the Court noted that bizarre
shape could still be "persuasive circumstantial evidence" of the legislature's intent to cre-
ate a racially gerrymandered district. See id. at 913 (where the Court held the district in-
valid due to circumstantial evidence of the district's shape and demographics).
'" See 509 U.S. at 649 (questioning "whether 'the intentional creation of majority-mi-
nority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim" (quoting
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 668 (White, J, dissenting))).
" See Blissman, supra note 31, at 537-38 (arguing that Miller effectively undermined
the appearance test in Shaw, and that a new problem arises when a district is irregular in
shape, but not sufficiently bizarre to trigger the Shaw test; Miller leaves the courts con-
fused as to what degree the legislature is permitted to consider race in reshaping its dis-
tricts).
" 116 S. Ct 1941 (1996).
10 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1951-52.
See id. at 1955.
91- 116 S. Ct 1894 (1996).
Id. at 1902 (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987)).
Id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).
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discriminatory classification." 6 Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist found that North Carolina's plan had not been narrowly
tailored to accomplish the state's interest, as it failed to meet the
criteria set forth in Thornburg.'
To date, the Court has failed to develop a manageable standard
by which to evaluate racial gerrymandering claims. The alternative
discriminatory intent tests, Miller's predominant motive test, and
Shaw's bizarre shape test have left lower courts in a state of con-
fusion as to how to evaluate racial gerrymandering claims.' Fur-
ther, the Court has left states "walking a tightrope." If legisla-
tures create majority-minority districts, they face lawsuits under the
Equal Protection Clause. If they do not create such districts, they
face claims for failing to comply with the Voting Rights Act."°
C. Political Gerrymandering
Political gerrymandering was held to be a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question in early cases.' Slowly, however, the Court became
Id. at n.4 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730
(1982)).
'" See id. at 1898. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that because the plan was not drawn to
remedy past effects of discrimination it was not narrowly tailored. See id. Justice
Rehnquist also noted that the plan could not have been drawn to comply with § 5; creat-
ing a new majority-minority district before preclearance has been granted is not mandated
by the Section. See id. Finally, the district was not narrowly tailored to comply with § 2
of the Voting Rights Act, as it was not "geographically compact" as required under
Thornburg. See id.
See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Heading Back to the Thicket, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996,
at 40 (stating the Miller Court created a "bright-line ruling [that is as] clear as mud").
" Karlan, supra note 39, at 289 (arguing this "tightrope" has left legislatures con-
fused as to what course of action to employ when faced with the necessity of redis-
tricting and charged with violations regardless of what course is employed); see also
Frank R. Parker, Factual Errors and Chilling Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno
and Miller v. Johnson, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 527, 535 (1996) (comparing this concept to the
psychiatric term "double blind," whereby individuals receive conflicting messages about
how to behave causing them to feel subjected to conflicting obligations).
". See Karlan, supra note 39, at 289 (stating that compliance with the Voting Rights
Act will trigger suits for Equal Protection violations, while noncompliance will result in
suits under §§ 2 and 5).
OL See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). Justice Frankfurter
warned the Court not to enter the "political thicket" with regard to these claims. See id.
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less adverse to hearing political reapportionment claims,"°2 and
eventually held them to be justiciable in Davis v. Bandemer.'a
In Bandemer, Indiana Republicans passed a reapportionment
scheme following the 1980 census, calling for both single and
multi-member districts. Consequently, in the following election the
Republicans retained control of the state legislature, despite the fact
that Democrats received a majority of the popular vote." The
disparate results were achieved by "stacking" and "splitting"; that
is, stacking Democrats into districts which had strong Democratic
majorities, and splitting the other areas of Democratic support into
districts in which Republicans held safe majorities.l" In order to
invalidate the district, the Court required that plaintiffs demonstrate
1"2 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (articulating the "judicially manageable
standard" of "one person, one vote," although holding that political gerrymandering re-
mained nonjusticiable); Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding
malapportionment claims justiciable, but political gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable, as
there is a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [these
claims]"). In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), the Court maintained the
nonjusticiability of these claims, although Justice Harlan warned "that . . . partisan
'gerrymandering' may be subject to federal constitutional attack under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 6. In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court raised
the constitutionality of political gerrymandering for the first time, although the issue was
not resolved. In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court declared it may be
ready to declare political gerrymandering to be a justiciable question. In his concurrence,
Justice Stevens listed three elements plaintiffs must demonstrate in claim of political ger-
rymandering in order for the case to be justiciable:
[1] [T]hey belong to a politically salient class. . . . whose geographical distri-
bution is sufficiently ascertainable that it could have been taken into account in
drawing district boundaries. . . . [2] In the relevant district or districts or in
the State as a whole, their proportionate voting influence has been adversely
affected by the challenged scheme.. . . [And 3] [They can establish] a prima
facie showing that raises a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.
Id. at 754-55. (Stevens, J., concurring).
0 3. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Holding political gerrymandering to be justiciable, the
Court stated that there existed "judicially discernable and manageable standards by which
political gerrymander cases are to be decided." The Court reasoned that it could not hold
the claim beyond its jurisdiction merely because the controversy was dubbed a "political
one." Id. at 122. The majority explained that "[t]he courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a
bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated political exceeds constitu-
tional authority." Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
0' In the House races, Democrats received 51.9% of votes and 43 seats, while Repub-
licans received 48.1% of votes and 57 seats. See id. at 115. In the Senate races,
Democrats received 53.1% of votes and 13 seats, while Republicans received 46.9% of
votes, and 12 seats. See id. Additionally, in Marion and Allen Counties, Democrats re-
ceived 46.6% of votes, but Republicans received 86% of the seats. See id.
"'2 See id. at 116-17 (stating that these tactics evidenced clear intent on the part of
Republicans to disadvantage Democrats by giving Republicans safe majorities in the dis-
tricts in question).
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not only discriminatory intent on the part of the legislature against
a political group, but also actual discriminatory effect on that
group. 0
6
In describing the burden plaintiffs must meet to establish dis-
criminatory intent, Justice White explained that in the political
gerrymandering context, discriminatory intent is always present and
unavoidable."7 Regarding the element of discriminatory effect,
Justice White wrote that because the Constitution does not mandate
proportional representation, merely showing that a particular party
has lost an election will not establish discriminatory effect."6 Dis-
criminatory effect is established when "there is evidence that ex-
cluded groups have 'less opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice""'  or when "the
electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their
opportunity to influence the political process effectively....
[There must be] evidence of continued frustration of the will of a
majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of
a fair chance to influence the political process."'' 0
The Court struck down the plaintiffs' claim, finding an absence
of discriminatory intent on the part of the Republicans. This was
despite testimony from the Speaker of the House conceding that
the explicit purpose behind drawing boundaries in this manner was
to give Republicans an electoral advantage.' The Court also
found no actual discriminatory effects."'
'o6 See id. at 127.
'. See id. at 127-29. However, Justice White observed that while "discriminatory in-
tent may not be difficult to prove in this context does not, of course, mean that it need
not be proved at all to succeed on such a claim." Id. at 129 n.11.
' See id. at 132-33.
. Id. at 131 (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982)).
. d. at 133. This may be manifested in a lack of opportunity for a group to partic-
ipate in party deliberations, to slate or nominate their candidates, or to register to vote.
Additionally, election results from one year alone, as plaintiffs provided in this case, are
insufficient to establish discriminatory effect. See id.
'"- See id. at 117 n.5 (stating that the Speaker testified that in forming district
boundaries Republicans "wanted to save as many incumbent Republicans as possible").
"2 See id. at 134 (explaining that the factual findings of the district court did not
satisfy the threshold requirement of establishing discriminatory effect).
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III. REPRESENTATIONAL HARM IN GERRYMANDERING
Shaw v. Reno"3 described the harm inflicted by racial gerry-
mandering as representational, that is, the conscious disregard with
which the elected representative of a majority-minority district
treats the interests of individuals who reside in his or her district,
but who are not members of the minority group the district was
created to benefit. ' 4 The Court stated: "When a district obviously
is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of
one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that
their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that
group, rather than their constituency as a whole.".. 5
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Miller v. Johnson"6
helped define the concept of representational harm in the racial
gerrymandering context by describing two elements needed to es-
tablish such a claim. First, most minority voters must support the
same candidate." '7 Second, the elected representative must ignore
the interests of his or her non-minority constituents."'
In subsequent cases, the Court sought to severely restrict claims
of injury based on representational harm. United States v. Hays"9
held that only individuals living within racially gerrymandered
districts endure representational harm, while individuals living out-
side such districts remain unaffected by these practices.'20 Further-
more, in Davis v. Bandemer2 ' the Court did not address the
existence of representational harm in the political gerrymandering
context.'
.3. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
" See id. at 648. The Court argued districting plans which mandate results corre-
sponding to the racial population of an area "'emphasiz[e] differences between candidates
and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense."' Id. (quoting Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
115. Id.
' 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'" See id. at 930.
'. See id. Standing in a case of representational harm, Justice Stevens argued, "ulti-
mately depends on the very premise the Court purports to abhor, that voters of a
particular race 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
However, it should be noted the majority in Miller did not apply Justice Stevens' ele-
ments in concluding plaintiffs had proved representational harm, but rather concluded that
"[a]s residents of the challenged Eleventh District, all appellees had standing." Id. at 909.
"9- 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
See id. at 739.
1. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
22 See id. at 132.
[Vol. 48:617
SIMILAR HARM MEANS SIMILAR CLAIMS
These cases squarely contradict the holding set forth in Shaw,
which did not condition the injury of representational harm on its
occurring in the racial gerrymandering context." While Shaw
held that representational harm is assumed in the instance of racial
gerrymandering, Bandemer implied such harm either had to be
affirmatively demonstrated, or was nonexistent, in politically gerry-
mandered districts.
Additionally, Shaw did not require that plaintiffs reside in the
challenged district in order to have been injured by representational
harm. In fact, as Professor Karlan notes, the most "remarkable
aspect of Shaw was its complete disregard for standing require-
ments."'' 4 None of the Shaw plaintiffs lived in the challenged
First Congressional District, and only two of the five resided in the
Twelfth, the second challenged district."s
. While Hays and Bandemer seek to minimize the reach of rep-
resentational harm, this injury extends beyond the racial gerryman-
dering context and impacts residents of politically gerrymandered
districts as well. Additionally, the harm extends beyond residents of
the gerrymandered district and reaches those who remain in the
original district from which the gerrymandered district was created.
Since the harm is identical in both racial and political gerryman-
dering contexts, it is necessary to evaluate these claims under the
same standard. Therefore, the prong of discriminatory effect should
be eliminated as an element of proof from political gerrymandering
claims.
' See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993):
T]he individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The principle
of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a
Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Cauca-
sian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on. . . That sys-
tem, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, empha-
sizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the con-
stitutional sense.
(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
12,L Karlan, supra note 39, at 290; see also Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at
642-43, (asking: "If neither justiciability nor standing will bar potential challenges to the
nonbizarre use of race in redistricting, is there any stopping point short of the 'strict-scru-
tiny-all-the-way-down' model?"). Aleinikoff and Issacharoff argue that such a slippery
slope will lead to the application of strict scrutiny to all race-conscious districting under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 637 (describing that while two of the plaintiffs would vote
in the twelfth district, three of the plaintiffs resided in the second district, which was not
challenged).
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A. Representational Harm: Who is Injured?
Representational harm affects not only those living within a
gerrymandered district, but also those living outside the district in
the surrounding communities. Ensuring the election of a minority
candidate by means of constructing a twisting, turning district may
effectively promote increased minority representation in govern-
ment, but at the same time destroys natural communities which
have been formed by the conscious migration of individuals into
areas comprised of people with common interests. 6
Individuals naturally choose to live in areas in which they have
something in common with their neighbors, such as race, religion,
political affiliation, or educational values. 27 Charles Tiebout has
argued that where an individual resides is a conscious decision
based on his or her preference for government expenditures and
provision of public services.' Tiebout argues that consumers
analyze localities in terms of the expenditure patterns adopted by
local governments, and decide where to live according to which
communities best satisfy their preferences regarding the provision
of goods and services. 9 Social factors also play a large role in
personal relocation decisions. 3 Districts formed to ensure the
election of minority candidates, or candidates from particular polit-
ical parties, destroy the communities that people consciously choose
12& See CHARLES M. IEBOUT, SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER No. 16, THE COMMUNrIY ECO-
NOMIC BASE STUDY 13 (1962) (describing community economic base studies, which are
mechanisms for analyzing individual communities in terms of their economic activities in
order to enhance the quality of decision making by officials by empowering them to tailor
their decisions to the specific behavior and needs of local interests).
'" See Hamilton, supra note 38, at 1568 (arguing that race should not be the only
factor considered when creating districts as it is "only one factor among many in deter-
mining the identity of individuals," and that other factors play an equally critical role in
how people define themselves and what they have in common with others).
"s See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON 416,
418 (1956) (arguing that the availability and quality of public services, such as education,
is the determinative factor in an individual's decision of where to live).
. See id. Tiebout argues there is a difference between central and local provisions of
public goods. Central provision of goods reflects the government's adjusting its expendi-
tures to meet the perceived preferences of its citizens. The local level of provision is the
level at which expenditure levels are set. It is this latter category, Tiebout argues, that
consumers most seriously consider in deciding where to live. See id.
" See id. at n.12 (arguing that a variety of non-economic factors also play a large
role in people's decision as to which community to join; the fact that the consumer de-
sires "to associate with 'nice' people" plays a large role when deciding which community
best reflects one's preferences).
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to join. This, in turn, prevents the communities' unified voice from
being heard in the political process.
Representational harm injures individuals by removing them
from the communities they have consciously chosen to join, for
representational purposes, and placing them into gerrymandered
districts. The injury of representational harm is also suffered by
those individuals left behind in the diluted community, who now
have a smaller citizen base to fight for their interests. When gerry-
mandering removes people from their chosen communities and
places them into majority-minority districts, individuals from neigh-
boring areas must be added to the community from which they
were removed to satisfy districting population requirements."'
The result is the creation of districts comprised of fragmented
communities.
Individuals forced into such districts may find their interests
ignored by the elected representative." This is attributable to the
fact that these added people constitute only small parts of the
newly created districts. A representative who finds his or her views
at odds with a small portion of his or her constituency has no
incentive to ensure that the concerns of these individuals are ade-
quately represented. This result would not follow if the original
community had remained intact; the citizens then could have effec-
tively banded together to petition the representative to promote
legislation reflecting their collective interests.
The Court rejected this theory of representational harm, howev-
er, in United States v. Hays,' where it held that plaintiffs who
were not residents of the challenged racially gerrymandered district
did not have standing to sue.'34 In Hays, the 1990 census reduced
the number of congressional seats to which Louisiana was entitled
from eight to seven, and the district boundaries were redrawn to
create two majority-minority districts. 35 District 4 of the plan was
oddly shaped, and plaintiffs challenged its constitutionality.'36 The
m. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'- See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (explaining that when a district is
created for the benefit of one racial group, elected officials will believe their primary ob-
ligation is only to that group).
*1' 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
,34 See i& at 739.
-~ See id. at 740.
136 See id.
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district court found the plan to be unconstitutional, and the State
appealed. 13
7
The Supreme Court chose to resolve the question by turning to
the issue of standing, although it was not raised by any of the
parties.'38 The Court concluded that because plaintiffs did not
reside in the challenged district, they did not suffer the representa-
tional harm as defined by Shaw.'39 The Court reasoned that only
individuals able to allege injury as a direct result of having person-
ally been denied equal treatment have standing to assert claims."4°
The Court concluded that plaintiffs had presented nothing more
than a generalized grievance against conduct of which they did not
approve and that they had not been directly affected by the
districting plan because they did not reside in the challenged dis-
trict.
141
Hays presumes that those who do not reside in a challenged
district are not injured by the gerrymandering that created the
district. However, the Court noted that a plaintiff residing outside
the district may be injured if he or she is able to show he or she
was personally denied equal treatment.42
'- See Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994).
" The Court stated it was obligated to consider the issue of standing, "'even if the
courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before
us. The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdic-
tion, and standing is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines."' Hays,
515 U.S. at 742 (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990)).
19- See id. at 745 (stating that "where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he
or she does not suffer those special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff has per-
sonally been subjected to a racial classification would not be justified absent specific evi-
dence tending to support that inference").
". See id.
'4. See id.; see also Jack Pritchard, Note, United States v. Hays: A Winnowing of
Standing to Sue in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 47 MERCER L. REV. 955, 961 (1996)
(interpreting the Court as holding that those living inside the district were directly injured
by the plan, while those residing outside the district were only indirectly affected).
i' See Hays, 515 U.S. at 746. This standard is difficult, but not impossible to sur-
mount, it should be noted, as seen in Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Fla.
1995). In Johnson, plaintiffs filed suit alleging a majority-minority district violated the
Equal Protection Clause. See id. Citing Hays, the court imposed a rigorous standard for
proving harm to individuals living outside the challenged district before permitting parties
to intervene in the action. See id. at 1539-40. One of the few motions the court granted
was that of Andrew Johnson, who lost his seat in the 1992 congressional elections due to
the redistricting. He was gerrymandered out of the district but ran for the seat under the
Qualifications Clause of the Constitution, which permits the election of a representative
who does not live in the district being represented. See id. The court denied most other
motions to intervene, establishing that the standard for proving harm when an individual
lives outside a challenged district is difficult to meet. See id. at 1538 (denying the motion
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The holding in Hays changes the notion of representational
harm set forth in Shaw v. Reno.43 In Shaw, the Court did not
condition representational harm on whether the plaintiffs resided in
the challenged district, but stated that the harmful effects of racial
gerrymandering reach all people in a state'" by "reinforc[ing] ra-
cial stereotypes and threaten[ing] to undermine our system of repre-
sentative democracy."'4 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hays
supports this view.'" He argued that standing did not depend on
whether plaintiffs were residents of the challenged district, but
whether plaintiffs put forth a showing of discriminatory effect that
resulted in denial of their right to participate in the political pro-
cess.
147
Contrary to Hays, residents both inside and outside gerryman-
dered districts are harmed and thus have standing to seek redress.
First, as is supported by Hays, those placed in racially or political-
ly gerrymandered districts are obviously placed at a disadvantage.
They are forced to participate in electing representatives from a
community with which they may share little in common, and in
which representatives are free to disregard their interests due to the
impossibility of their vote affecting the outcome of an election.'"
to intervene of other congressional representatives of the state whose districts might be re-
drawn pending the outcome of the case); id. at 1537 (denying motions to intervene of
several organizations which claimed to represent the interests of voters in the district); id.
at 1536 (denying the motions to intervene of an individual who resided outside the dis-
trict in question).
t' 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
"~ See id. at 650.
lSId.; see also Pritchard, supra note 141, at 964 (arguing that racial gerrymandering
injures both those who live inside and outside the challenged district); Supreme Court:
Leading Cases, Voting Rights and Race-Based Districting, 109 HARV. L. REV. 160, 167
(1995) (arguing that if the theory espoused in Shaw is correct, "a state resident who was
excluded from the challenged district because of his race has suffered the same harm as
one who was included in the district, and thus, also ought to have a cause of action").
", See Hays, 515 U.S. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring).
". See id. However, in his reasoning, Justice Stevens called for a showing of discrim-
inatory effect, a test employed in political gerrymandering cases only. See id.; see also
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986) (upholding a politically gerrymandered
district as constitutional because plaintiffs failed to show the discriminatory effect of the
plan; they had not been denied the right to participate in the political process).
148 See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial
Gerrymandering, 1 MicH. J. RACE & L. 47, 63 (1996) (giving as an example of such di-
lution of voting strength an instance of two neighboring farmers who wish to form a co-
alition to increase farm subsidies, but whose lands are divided as part of a racial gerry-
mander The inquiry addresses whether each farmer in this situation "has not been dealt
an equal blow regarding his chances of forming a political coalition"). But see Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (impliedly recognizing limitations on the community of
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One counter-argument to this theory of representational harm is
that individuals brought into majority-minority districts who are not
members of the minority group benefitted by the district are not
discriminated against because of their race. Rather, these individu-
als are taken into the districts for the sole purpose of meeting the
equal population requirements."4 As Professor Karlan puts it,
"whether they are white, Asian, Hispanic, or purple with green
spots has no bearing on their assignment to a particular dis-
trict."'50 Because race has not been considered in including these
individuals in the district, they have not been injured by the racial
classification.' Under this premise, Karlan concludes, white vot-
ers placed in majority-minority districts have not been injured
because they are the "least likely" to have been personally injured
by a racial classification.'52
This argument is refuted by turning to the theory of communi-
ties of interest, discussed above. Voters placed into a majority-
minority district, who are not members of the racial group the
district was created to benefit, suffer from representational harm
because of a racial classification. While they themselves have not
been placed into the district because of their race, they are still
victims of representational harm. They have been placed into a
district where it is certain their votes "do not, and should not,
count."'53 These individuals are politically paralyzed by their in-
ability to elect an official who will represent their interests. The
final result is the elected representative's awareness that he or she
may continually disregard these constituents' concerns without
jeopardizing his or her chances for re-election.
interest argument: because blacks represented only a majority of the population in five of
the state's 100 counties, it is plausible to assert that the district was constructed in such a
bizarre shape to actually pull together a community of interest which was otherwise divid-
ed across the state).
"'. See Karlan, supra note 39, at 292 (arguing it is wrong to presume a racial classi-
fication has affected all people in a gerrymandered district).
150. Id.
. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 602 (describing such individuals as
"filler people"). Whenever a reference is made to "filler people" in this Note, the credit
for this concept goes to Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff.
152 See Karlan, supra note 39, at 292 (arguing race of filler people is irrelevant; be-
cause they have been placed in the challenged district in spite of their race-not because
of it-it is impossible to argue they have been injured by the racial classification).
" Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 91.
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Second, and notwithstanding the Court's holding in Hays, indi-
viduals left in the original district are also harmed by the creation
of the gerrymandered district. 4 People living in close proximity
to one another usually possess similar political and social inter-
ests. "'55 Dividing communities based on racial or political classi-
fications results in the creation of areas lacking a cohesive core of
citizens with common interests. 56 It is inherently more difficult
for a representative to ascertain the interests of the community
when there is a great degree of diversity among its residents.'57
As Justice Powell articulated in Karcher v. Daggett, "[a] legislator
cannot represent his constituents properly-nor can voters from a
fragmented district exercise the ballot intelligently-when a voting
district is nothing more than an artificial unit divorced from, and
indeed often in conflict with, the various communities established
in the State." '158 Thus, when a community of interest is carved up
*' See Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 148, at 64 ("[A] decision to include one
kind of person is fundamentally also a decision to exclude other kinds of people").
Issacharoff and Goldstein also argue that when a line is drawn between neighbors for
racial reasons it is not possible "to believe that one but not the other has had its repre-
sentational opportunities conditioned on the basis of race." Id. at 63. See Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that where the boundaries of the challenged
district were drawn to include almost all the whites in Tuskegee, but almost no blacks,
sufficient evidence of racial motivation existed and the district was struck down); cf.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding unconstitutional in a criminal case the use
of race-based peremptory strikes in jury selections; under third party standing principles
the criminal defendant had standing to sue although the juror's rights were violated); Ryan
Guilds, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal
Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1863, 1898 (1996) (arguing that the Court in Hays ap-
plied an inconsistent analysis from the standard applied in Powers in concluding the harm
alleged was nothing more than a generalized grievance, and criticizing the Court for its
failure to explain why voters in Hays lacked a cognizable injury).
"' See Blissman, supra note 31, at 542 (arguing that in communities of interest, the
citizens are effectively represented by one individual because they all have generally the
same political and social needs; once such a community is destroyed through apportion-
ment a community is created which possesses no common interests among its residents).
"6. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that "[w]hen racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial,
multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become
separatist").
"S7 See Blissman, supra note 31, at 541 (asserting that the goal of attaining adequate
representation of a district's residents is thwarted when the district is comprised of such a
diverse group of citizens that it becomes impossible to ascertain their interests, which
may, at times, be in direct conflict).
'-'3 462 U.S. 725, 787 (1983). For a discussion of possible remedies to representational
harm, see Issacharoff and Goldstein, supra note 148, at 55. One remedy to representation-
al harm in the racial gerrymandering context that has been suggested by Professors
Issacharoff and Goldstein is to draw racially gerrymandered districts not to give minorities
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to create a majority-minority district, those left behind are injured
just as much as those brought into the gerrymandered district,
although in a different way: They are injured by the inclusion of
their neighbors in the district and by the corresponding division
and dilution of an otherwise cohesive community with shared polit-
ical and social concerns.
B. Representational Harm Is Injurious in Politically as Well as
Racially Gerrymandered Districts
The concept of communities of interest applies to the partisan
context as well. One commentator has argued that communities of
interest are generally "homogeneous in class and partisanship,"'59
and that people who live in defined communities tend to share
political preferences."W It follows that representational harm ap-
plies in political gerrymandering cases. For example, if a communi-
ty has a sufficient majority to elect a Democrat, and Republicans
divide the community as part of a political gerrymander, they will
destroy a cohesive community of interest and prevent the Demo-
crats from being represented by an official whom they would oth-
erwise elect. This results in the election of a representative who
will ignore the concerns of district-filling people not of the same
political affiliation as the representative. 6'
Since the incumbent from the politically gerrymandered district
knows he or she represents an area which has been crafted so that
a majority of the residents share his or her political views, the
representative has no incentive to acknowledge other voters' con-
cerns: "'Safe districts remove the incentive to grant political con-
cessions to constituent interests or create electoral coalitions [that]
ensure representation of diverse points of view. ' '' 2 In fact, grant-
an overwhelming population advantage in a particular district, but rather to make the con-
test a closer one. See id. They argue that in such a district, an elected representative
would be a fool to ignore the interests of the losing group, who actually could have an
impact on upcoming elections, and would result in representatives' treating with increased
equal regard the interests of those individuals. See id.
. Morrill, supra note 2, at 216.
2W See id.
161. See Sally Dworak-Fisher, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 131 (1996) (arguing that incumbents in politically gerrymandered districts can
be less sensitive to the concerns of their constituents. They have a reduced fear of being
defeated at the polls due to the overwhelming support the district has been crafted to pro-
vide).
"' Id. at 149 (alterations in original) (quoting BRUCE ADAMS, TOWARD A SYSTEM OF
"FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION": A COMMON CAUSE REPORT ON STATE AND
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big the minority party's point of view deference in a gerryman-
dered district would be foolish. The representative would risk of-
fending the constituents whose support the district was designed to
guarantee.
This harm is inflicted on both those living within the gerry-
mandered district and those living outside it. Both are deprived of
the voting strength of individuals with whom they share common
interests. This can be regarded as a form of vote dilution; forcing
people into districts where it. is impossible for their votes to count
obviously decreases their power to influence the political process. It
is contemplated in drawing these district lines that these filler
people will have no hope of influencing an election; the results are
predetermined.
The Court, in Davis v. Bandemer,63 rejected the notion that
representational harm is suffered by voters who have been placed
into politically gerrymandered districts. Despite the harm articulated
in Shaw-that representatives elected from gerrymandered districts
ignore the interests of filler people-Bandemer held that this harm
is not present in political gerrymandering. " The Court stated that
when a group loses an election they are "deemed to be adequately
represented by the winning candidate and to have as much oppor-
tunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district....
[It] cannot... [be] presume[d] ... that the candidate elected will
entirely ignore the interests of those voters."' "
Despite the Court's insistence that representational harm does
not occur in the political gerrymandering context, the obvious
result of any group's attaining political power is that its policies
and goals will be implemented to the detriment of the views of the
CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT 24 (1977)).
" 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
's See id. at 132.
65 Id. at 132; see also Parker, supra note 99, at 534-35 (arguing that the entire no-
tion of representational harm goes against the core of our political system because it calls
for proportional representation, which is not a constitutional right: "[W]e assume that the
representative who is elected ...will serve the constituency as a whole and not merely
the voters who elected him or her").
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losing party." Concurring in part in Bandemer, Justice Powell
pointed out:
[I]t defies political reality to suppose that members of a
losing party have as much political influence over state
government as do members of the victorious party. Even
the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard
opportunities to reward persons or groups who were active
supporters in their election campaigns. Similarly, no one
doubts that partisan considerations play a major role in the
passage of legislation and the appointment of state offi-
cers.
167
Clearly then, when a particular political group loses an election,
its interests are largely disregarded in the formulation and passage
of legislation. In one sense, this result is contemplated by our
system of government which operates under a "spoils system" of
election. However, a result not contemplated arises when political
gerrymandering is used to effectively manipulate the exact outcome
in a given election; the losing party is consistently and effectively
denied the opportunity to have a meaningful chance at electing the
representative of its choice."l s
This result does not literally deny voters the opportunity to
participate in the political process (the discriminatory effect element
Bandemer contemplates);" however it is impossible for a com-
petitive election to take place in districts which are designed to
guarantee incumbent retention. 70 In this sense, voters in these
" See Dworak-Fisher, supra note 161, at 148 (arguing that in any type of gerryman-
dering the result of manipulating district boundaries is the undermining of the "collective
will"). See generally Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering:
Bandemer and Thomburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29, 49 (Ber-
nard Grofman ed., 1990) (arguing that differences in policies between political parties re-
flect "mediating mechanisms" through which voter preferences are gauged and that disre-
gard of a party's interests by the party in power translates into voter discrimination).
67. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 170 (Powell, J., concurring).
i" However, it should be noted that the harm in political and racial gerrymandering
cases can be distinguished based on the stigma which attaches to a racial classification.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993), described this stigma as the assumption that all
members of a racial classification "think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls." It can be argued that no such stigma is present
in a classification based on political affiliation.
'69. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131 (stating that "[o]nly where there is evidence that
excluded groups have 'less opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice' are discriminatory effects shown (quoting Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982))).
. The goal of incumbent retention in the reapportionment process has developed into
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districts are denied the right to meaningfully participate in the
political process. Their votes are rendered ineffectual in a system
in which the outcome is already set."' Not only does this prevent
representation of the minority party's interests, it serves to under-
mine the meaningfulness of the electoral system in the minds of
minority party voters in a politically gerrymandered district. They
come to realize that their votes do not matter, and that their pros-
pects of influencing the political process are slim."
This harm also results in the racial gerrymandering context,
when individuals are forced out of their communities of interest
and into districts with people with whom they share nothing in
common. The harm suffered by these groups is the same: Each
group is placed into a district in which it is almost certain their
votes will not enable them to elect candidates of their choosing. As
a result, and as Shaw contemplates, a substantial risk exists that
their interests will be wholly ignored by the elected representative.
one of the permissible traditional districting criteria defined by the Court in Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So
Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. REV. 289, 311 (1997) (arguing that "[t]he
key 'tradition' is for the ins to keep themselves in and the outsiders out' through in-
cumbent retention and maintenance of the political party in power); Pamela S. Karlan &
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1205-06 (1996). Mill-
er defined traditional districting principles to be adhered to in the reapportionment process
as "compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined
by actual shared interests." Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
". Computer technology has made the ability to predict the outcome of a given elec-
tion much more accurate. Justice Harlan stated in his dissent in Wells v. Rockefeller, 394
U.S. 542, 551 (1969), that a "computer may grind out district lines which can totally
frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues"; see also
Michelle H. Browdy, Computer Models and Post-Bandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE LJ.
1379, 1387 (1990) (arguing that while automated redistricting by computer may provide
objective standards for legislative use in redistricting, great potential exists to use this re-
source as a means to attain politically desirable results for incumbents).
" See Morrill, supra note 2, at 238 (stressing that the meaningfulness of electoral
districts is critical in the eyes of voters, as these are entities with which residents identify
and are therefore not just "merely passing conveniences for the holding of elections"). But
see Melvyn R. Durchslag, United States v. Hays: An Essay on Standing to Challenge Ma-
jority-Minority Voting Districts, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 341, 367-69 (1997) (arguing federal
congressional districts need not conform to communities of interest to the extent such
adherence is mandated at the state and local level: it is "irrelevant to the articulation of
national policy that congressional districts have some distinct sense of communal identi-
ty"). Professor Durehslag stated, however, that state and local districting schemes should
adhere to communal boundaries because state legislative policy is formed reflecting the
uniqueness of local political subdivisions. See id.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Eliminating the Element of Discriminatory Effect in Political
Gerrymandering Cases and Working Toward a Shaw-like
Application of Discriminatory Intent
Justice Stevens argued that "[iln the line drawing process,
racial, religious, ethnic and economic gerrymanders are all species
of political gerrymanders."'73 Many other commentators have also
argued that political and racial gerrymanders are really the same
cause of action.74 The similarity of these claims lies in the harm
suffered by the victims. In both racial and politically gerryman-
dered districts, the residents who are not members of the group the
district was created to benefit are at a substantial risk that the
representative elected will ignore their interests, giving deference
only to the concerns of the majority party or group the district was
intended to benefit. 5 Since this representational harm occurs in
both types of gerrymandering claims, these cases should be evalu-
ated under the Equal Protection Clause by the same standard.
To prove racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection
Clause, plaintiffs need only establish evidence of discriminatory
intent.'76 However, as established by Bandemer, both discrimina-
tory intent and effect must be shown to invalidate a district as a
political gerrymander, a much higher standard."r This additional
element of discriminatory effect, the Court said, is not evidence
that the contesting group lost an election, or that election of its
candidates is difficult. 7 ' Rather, it is "evidence of a continued
frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial
'. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 88 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
'7 See Hamilton, supra note 38, at 1545 (arguing that political and racial gerryman-
dering raise similar constitutional questions; both claims have ties to partisan politics and
therefore both should be deemed per se unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause); LeRoy D. Percy, Political and Racial Gerrymandering: A Proposal for Compara-
ble Causes of Action, 65 Miss. LJ. 385 (1995) (arguing that since both claims arise un-
der the same principle of equal protection they should be accorded similar treatment; how-
ever, he argues the standard of evaluating racial gerrymandering claims should be raised
to require a showing of discriminatory effect).
'. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993).
1 See id. Whether the effect element has been entirely done away with, however, is
unclear. "We express no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority
districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim." Id. at 649 (quot-
ing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 668 (White, J., dissenting)).
'. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
See id. at 132.
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to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political
process."' 9 This standard has proven a nebulous one, leaving
courts and commentators perplexed as to what must be demonstrat-
ed to prove this "continued frustration."'
Bandemer's requirement of demonstrating discriminatory effect
has left a claim of political gerrymandering impossible to estab-
lish.' In our modem political system it is inconceivable that a
group would literally be denied the right to vote, or effectively be
denied the right to participate in the political process, as Bandemer
demands." The Court in Bandemer also stated that a continued
pattern of voter frustration will suffice to prove the requisite dis-
criminatory effect.'83 However, the Court emphasized that such
frustration cannot be established by losing one election, or even
"where the losing group loses election after election." ' 4 Thus, the
I'. Id. at 133. The Court stated that a group may prove they have been denied the
opportunity to influence the political process by demonstrating a denial of "members of
the group to participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates,
their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly influence the
election returns and to secure the attention of the winning candidate." Id. Such a standard
seems insurmountable, although several commentators have applauded the Court for articu-
lating this test. See, e.g., Grofinan, supra note 166, at 30 (arguing that the Court did in
fact articulate a manageable test in Bandemer requiring a showing the district was "(1)
intentional, (2) severe, and (3) predictable nontransient in its effects"). However, an equal
number of scholars consider Bandemer to be the final word on the subject of partisan
gerrymandering and argue the standard set forth is impossible to meet. See, e.g., Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 64, 96 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (arguing that
the standard articulated in Bandemer makes it impossible for a political gerrymandering
claim to succeed).
's Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman, The Constitutionality of Political Geny-
mandering: Davis v. Bandemer and Beyond, 4 J.L. & POL 697, 724 (1988). Miller and
Packman criticize this standard and highlight its confusing aspects: If losing only one
election is insufficient to show discriminatory effect, what will constitute a sufficient
showing? If elections are held once every two years, by the time five elections have
passed the state must redistrict again as part of the decennial census. Knowing this, they
argue, it is logical to deduce that between two and four elections must be lost to prove
the requisite discriminatory effect; however, the Court refused to clarify this in Bandemer.
See id.
'. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 179, at 96 (questioning why the Court bothered
to hold political gerrymandering justiciable if the test articulated, as well as political and
social realities, make it impossible for the claim to succeed).
'82- See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131; Mark A. Packman, Reapportionment: The Supreme
Court Searches for Standards, 21 UR. LAw. 925, 945 (1989) (arguing that the require-
ment that plaintiffs prove they had been denied the opportunity to participate in the polit-
ical process does not make sense because "in our two-party system those two parties are
the political process").
" See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131.
"1 Id. at 132.
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Court created an insurmountable requirement by calling for proof
of discriminatory effect in a political gerrymandering case, leaving
it impossible to effectively challenge such districts, and rendering
political gerrymandering the "constitutional" form of gerrymander-
ing.18 5
The idea that it is permissible, even constitutionally acceptable,
for political parties to manipulate district boundaries to ensure
retention of incumbents is repugnant to a system which purports to
allow the people of a community to elect a representative who best
reflects the interests of that community.'86 Political gerrymander-
ing is a practice which results in the systematic degradation of
citizens' empowerment to change the composition of government.
A corresponding decrease in confidence in our electoral system
arguably follows. One commentator argues: "If a particular rule
works to the systematic disadvantage of one group over another,
members of that disadvantaged group are less likely to think the
rules, and any policies produced by them, are legitimate."' 7 The
standard for proving political gerrymandering in equal protection
claims should therefore be lowered to that required in equal protec-
tion racial gerrymandering cases; the element of discriminatory
effect should be eliminated.
In addition to eliminating the requirement of showing discrimi-
natory effect to prove a political gerrymander, the standard by
which the Court evaluates discriminatory intent in these cases must
also be revised. As was seen in Miller v. Johnson,8' clear evi-
dence of discriminatory intent in creating a politically gerryman-
dered district must be sufficient to declare the district invalid. The
". See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. CL 1941, 1956 (1996).
"s It should be noted that the arguments, set forth in this Note challenge established
notions of incumbency protection as a valid state interest. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139
(recognizing incumbency protection to be a valid state interest and holding that where re-
districting is done to effectuate incumbent retention, no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause will result); see also Dworak-Fisher, supra note 161, at 131 (recognizing other le-
gitimate benefits of incumbency protection, such as stability in the legislature, high quality
of candidates, and the perks a senior representative is able to bring home to his or her
district).
". Cain supra note 3, at 132.
88s 515 U.S. 900 (1995). The Court struck down a redistricting plan not on the basis
of bizarre shape, but rather because race was the "predominant factor motivating" the
district's creation. Id. at 916. As evidence of discriminatory intent, the Court held,
plaintiffs could rely on "circumstantial evidence of the district's shape and demographics
or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose . . . " which would prove "that the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial consider-
ations." Id.
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analysis employed by the Court in Bandemer regarding proof of
discriminatory intent rendered the element meaningless, and de-
clared discriminatory intent to be an acceptable purpose of a legis-
lature in creating a districting scheme.'89
In Bandemer, the deposition testimony of the Indiana Speaker
of the House of Representatives clearly evidenced the legislature's
discriminatory intent in creation of the districting plan; he stated
that the districting scheme was created to "save as many incumbent
Republicans as possible."'" The Court disregarded this testimony
as evidencing any meaningful showing of discriminatory intent,
stating that political redistricting is intended to have substantial
political consequences.' 9' The Court stated that "[als long as re-
districting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult
to prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportion-
ment were intended."'"
It is necessary to bring the use of discriminatory intent in
political gerrymandering cases in line with its application in equal-
protection racial-gerrymandering cases. In Shaw, discriminatory
intent was shown by looking at the shape of the district alone.93
The Court stated that "[n]o inquiry into legislative purpose is nec-
essary when the racial classification appears on the face of the stat-
ute."'94  One suggestion posed by Professors Aleinikoff and
Issacharoff is to presume a district unconstitutional whenever there
is a significant deviation from the traditional districting principle of
compactness.' 95 This approach would effectively preserve commu-
nities of interest by ensuring a district does not twist and turn all
over the state, but is confined to. several neighborhoods in close
proximity to one another.
"' See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at Ill (stating that "[e]ven if a state legislature redistricts
with the specific intention of disadvantaging one 'political party's election prospects, there
has been no unconstitutional violation against members of that party").
90 Id. at 117 n.5. One Republican Senator testified that he admitted telling a Demo-
crat colleague, "You will have the privilege to offer a minority map. But I will advise
you in advance that it will not be accepted." Id. When asked to explain this comment the
Senator stated, "I don't make goals for the opposite team." Id.
'9' See id. at 128.
9 Id. at 129.
'' See Shaw .v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Id. at 642.
292. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 621 (arguing that such an approach
would prevent bizarre-looking districts from being upheld on the grounds they conformed
to the equipopulation rules, but acknowledging such approach also contains weaknesses, as
Shaw failed to articulate clear guidance behind the "I know it when I see it' approach).
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Justice Powell's dissent in Bandemer lends support to this
proposal. He advocated "reference to the configurations of the
districts, [and] the observance of political subdivision lines" in
determining whether a district's bizarre shape provides evidence of
discriminatory intent." In his concurrence in Karcher v. Daggett,
Justice Stevens also argued that failure to adhere to compactness is
sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to invalidate a political-
ly gerrymandered district." He argued that mathematical methods
are available for measuring the compactness of districts, and that
deviation from these measurements is strongly suggestive of gerry-
mandering."' Other commentators have argued for application of
the compactness standard, agreeing that disregard for principles of
compactness evidences clear intent to create a partisan gerryman-
der.1
99
By constructing a compact district, communities of interest will
naturally be preserved. When a district significantly deviates from
the compact model, it necessarily breaks up communities of interest
and can be presumed to have been constructed to effectuate an
illegal gerrymander, just as Shaw contemplates."u
While absolute compactness of a district may not always be
possible due to population distribution and geographic features of
the area,"0' adhering to established county lines and municipal
boundaries provides further safeguards against partisan gerryman-
" Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 578-79 (1963) (stating that "[i]ndiscriminate districting, without any regard for
political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an
open invitation to partisan gerrymandering").
See 462 U.S. 725, 758 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id. at 755-56.
See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 77, 117-18 (1985) (developing 12 prima facie indicators of gerrymander-
ing and naming among them the failure to adhere to standards of compactness); Hamilton,
supra note 38, at 1569 (arguing that adherence to historical boundaries is the best way to
control gerrymandering and ensure compact and contiguous districts that preserve commu-
nities of interest; that cities and counties should not be divided except when absolutely
necessary to adhere to the one person, one vote standard). For a discussion of the merits
of using a compactness standard, see generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper,
The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerryman-
dering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301 (1991).
. See Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (stating that when a district is "so
extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segre-
gate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles,"
it will be declared invalid).
" See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 788 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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dering. Justices Powell and Stevens agree and have argued that
failure to adhere to these established boundaries is evidence of
partisan gerrymandering 2m
Eliminating the necessity of proving discriminatory effect from
a claim of political gerrymandering, and allowing discriminatory
intent to be shown by the shape of the district alone, as Shaw
contemplates, will increase the ease with which politically gerry-
mandered districts may be invalidated. This will provide a mean-
ingful remedy to the individuals in these areas who endure repre-
sentational harm, and permit politically gerrymandered districts to
be successfully challenged. A corresponding increase in voter confi-
dence in our electoral system will arguably occur, and individuals
will be inspired to participate in the political process when it is
apparent that electoral outcomes are no longer predetermined.
B. The Dangers of Racial Pretext
The element of discriminatory effect necessary to invalidate a
district as a political gerrymander should also be eliminated in light
of the ease with which a district can be invalidated as a racial
gerrymander. Race must be prevented from being used as a pretext
for challenging districts that are actually political gerrymanders.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bush v. Vera °u recognized this danger
and advocated confronting political challenges head on, instead of
allowing them to hide behind claims of racial gerrymandering.
In Bush, the Court struck down a Texas redistricting plan
which created three new majority-minority seats.20' The plurality
opinion rejected the appellant's argument that the districts had been
created for the purpose of incumbency protection because it found
that racial data had played a greater role in constructing the district
lines than had party affiliation data. °5 Writing for the plurality,
Justice O'Connor concluded that this was an instance where race
See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(arguing that one criteria in measuring the merits of a political gerrymandering claim is
the plan's adherence to political subdivision lines); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 755 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that substantial deviation from political boundaries is evidence of par-
tisan gerrymandering).
21 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1974 (1996).
See id. at 1963.
25 See id. at 1956 (stating that the districts were created with the intent of maximiz-
ing black voting strength as efforts were made by incumbents to retain black voters in
their districts).
653
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
had been used as a proxy for determining political characteristics,
and therefore, was properly subjected to strict scrutiny.2te
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the record in Bush
showed this was a case of political, not racial gerrymandering. He
argued that evidence existed to support the conclusion that political
data had been relied on to a much greater extent than racial data,
showing that the district was, in fact, a political gerrymander.'re
He argued evidence that the legislature considered race when con-
structing the districts does not, in and of itself, prove a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, there must be evidence that
"racial considerations 'subordinated' race-neutral districting princi-
ples. '2"" Finding no evidence of such subordination, he argued
that political affiliation data had been the driving force behind the
districting scheme."r9
Justice Stevens believed evidence that 97% of black voters in
the challenged districts were Democrats clearly showed the scheme
was politically motivated.10 However, the Court chose not to
consider the party-affiliation evidence presented by appellants and
' See id. (arguing that if the aim of the legislature is political gerrymandering it is
appropriate for the legislature to rely on political data, such as voting patterns, to con-
struct a district which will permit incumbent retention; however, to the extent race is used
to determine a community's political affiliation, an impermissible racial stereotype has
been used as a proxy for determining political identification). In reaching the conclusion
that this was in fact a racial gerrymander, Justice O'Connor relied on testimony from
state officials in previous litigation in which they contended that "'race was the primary
consideration in the construction of District 30."' Id. at 1957 (quoting Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1994)). Justice O'Connor also relied on a letter writ-
ten by one Congresswoman who stated that protection of incumbents was achieved by us-
ing racial data. See id. (citing Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1322).
" See id. at 1957.
2M Id.
. See id. Justice Stevens discussed the district's bizarre shape and concluded it was
created to accomplish retention of two incumbents whose districts were threatened by the
redistricting requirement; District 30 had been carved between these two districts so it
would not take away any of the incumbents' support. See id. At the same time, District
30 itself twisted and turned to include within its lines the maximum amount of
Democratic voters it could find. See id. However, the "tentacles" of the district stretched
out not to pull in additional black voters, but instead to include Democratic voters, only
21% of whom were black in the most twisted arm of the district. See id. at 1983. In
other arms, the share of minorities in the district was reduced, not increased. See id. As
to the majority's argument that using racial data as a proxy for determining political affil-
iation was an illegal racial stereotype, Justice Stevens argued that requiring the State to
disregard correlations between race and party affiliation is "as harmful, as it would be to
prohibit the Public Health Service from targeting African-American communities in an ef-
fort to increase awareness regarding sickle-cell anemia." Id. at 1988.
2"' See id. at 1988.
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instead determined that the scheme was constructed solely with the
residents' race as the dispositive quality.2 Arguably, the majority
characterized the districting scheme in this manner because it was
clear the element of discriminatory effect demanded in Bandemer
was virtually impossible to establish.2 2 Believing the district
should be invalidated, the Court looked for evidence that racial
factors were considered, so that it could rely on this evidence in
characterizing the district as a racial gerrymander. In a footnote,
Justice Stevens cautioned the majority against such an approach,
stating, "I believe.., that the evils of political gerrymandering
should be confronted directly, rather than through the race-specific
approach that the Court has taken."2 3
Because what is really a political gerrymander cannot be invali-
dated unless plaintiffs allege the scheme is a racial gerrymander,
parties both bringing and defending these claims have incentives to
attempt to emphasize or downplay the degree to which consider-
ations of race and political affiliation played a role in enacting a
reapportionment plan. Consider the predecessor case to Shaw v.
Reno,"4 Pope v. Blue,2 5 in which the districting scheme eventu-
ally struck down in Shaw /126 was initially challenged as a polit-
ical gerrymander by the North Carolina Republican Party. In Pope,
the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove evidence of dis-
criminatory effect as called for by Bandemer, because they did not
"allege, nor can they, that the state's redistricting plan has caused
them to be 'shut out of the political process."'217 Despite dismiss-
al of the case in Pope, the very same reapportionment plan was
challenged only a few months later in Shaw v. Reno.2 " This time
2. See id.; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Sandramandered, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 8,
1996, at 6 (asserting that "the shape of the districts [in Bush v. Vera] was distorted by
political, not racial, considerations-namely, the desire of white Democratic incumbents in
the surrounding districts to keep enough black voters to protect their seats"); Terry Tang,
Court's 'Colorblindness' Masks a Fixation on Race, SEArrLE TIMES, June 21, 1996, at
B4 (arguing that the resulting inference is that a double standard exists in permitting bi-
zarre shaped white districts, but invalidating strangely shaped minority districts:
"Gerrymandering for white incumbents is OK, but doing the same for black politicians is
not.').
211 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 111, 132 (1986).
22 Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1975 n.2.
214 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
211 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992).
2 6 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
22 . Id. at 397 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132).
211. 509 U.S. at 630.
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the plan was challenged as a racial gerrymander and was invalidat-
ed.219
The lesson to challengers is this: If first your claim does not
succeed, try, try again, but the second time allege that you are
dealing with a racial gerrymander, not a political gerrymander.
Those defending a districting plan learn a different lesson: After
Shaw, defendants will emphasize the degree to which political data
was relied on in developing the plan. If the Court finds the district
to be a political gerrymander it will probably be upheld.
This lesson has been learned. Once the Court's decision in
Shaw left states fearing that racial considerations could not play a
role in district reapportionment, defendants in gerrymandering
claims found themselves searching for voter registration and party
affiliation data on which they could claim they relied in developing
a districting plan. For instance, in Hays v. Louisiana,20 which
was originated before Shaw was decided, the State of Louisiana
originally admitted the plan was a racial gerrymander." Howev-
er, in light of the implications of Shaw, decided in the interim, the
State changed its arguments and attempted to show factors other
than race had been relied on in creating the challenged dis-
tricts."2 The State argued that political data had been strongly
considered in formulating the district, but the Court dismissed this
argument, recognizing it as a pretext for defending what was really
a racial gerrymander. The Court stated, "[W]e have been shown no
credible evidence supporting the defence witnesses' proffered moti-
vations of party and incumbency protection and socioeconomic
commonality. Their explanations ring hollow. We find them to be
no more than disingenuous, post hoc rationalizations."2" The
Court noted that during the trial of the case, which took place
before Shaw was decided, "[d]efendants never suggested that parti-
san or incumbent politics played a role in the determination to
create District 4.' 224
29. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding the scheme challenged in Shaw
v. Reno to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as a racial gerrymander).
. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). This case was the predecessor to United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
" See Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
See id. Such factors included respect for political subdivisions, adherence to com-
munities of interest, religious and ethnic considerations, economic base of the community,
geography, and topography. See id.
I3 d. at 1201.
22I ld.; see Tricia Ann Martinez, Comment, When Appearance Matters: Reapportion-
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Using race as a pretext to challenge a political gerrymander
carries several harmful implications. Justice Stevens explained that
the danger of this practice lies in the failure to recognize the evils
of political gerrymandering and address them directly: "political
gerrymanders are more objectionable than the 'racial
gerrymanders' ... [and] the evils of political gerrymandering
should be confronted directly. . . ." First, legislatures will be
permitted to create districting schemes wholly conscious of race, so
long as they take care to get on the record only evidence that they
considered political data in creating the district. This will lead to
increasing numbers of racially gerrymandered districts being upheld
on the grounds that there is no evidence on the record that race
was a predominant motivating factor in a district's development.
As Justice Stevens argued, "[I]t now seems clear that the only way
that a State can both create a majority-minority district and avoid a
racial gerrymander is by drawing, 'without much conscious
thought."' 6 Of course, Shaw's bizarre shape standard will afford
some protection against the most egregiously shaped districts, but
in cases where bizarreness of shape is less evident, this result will
certainly follow.
Second, parties in gerrymandering cases have an incentive to
craft their arguments based on the knowledge that a district will
invariably be upheld if it is shown to be a political gerrymander.
Plaintiffs will argue that race was the predominant motivating
factor behind a districting plan, while defendants will contend
political concerns dominated. The danger here lies in the fact that
if plaintiffs are ever to be successful in a gerrymandering chal-
lenge, they must allege the scheme is racially motivated, regardless
of how obvious it is that the district is a political gerrymander.
The evils of political gerrymandering will remain unrecognized, and
legislatures will be permitted continually to abuse the political
process to ensure incumbent retention and prevent trie representa-
tion of interests in cohesive communities.
ment under the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno, 54 LA. L. REv. 1335, 1360
(1994) (arguing that had the case originated before Shaw was decided, defendants would
have known to formulate non-racial explanations for the plan in advance to avoid being
accused of offering "post hoc rationalizations").
2" Bush v. Vera, 116 S. C. 1941, 1975 n.2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1990 (quoting Bush, 116 U.S. at 1955).
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V. CONCLUSION
Political gerrymandering is an evil practice by which the domi-
nate political party takes advantage of its position to ensure it
remains in power. In guaranteeing incumbent retention, legislatures
destroy individuals' conscientiously selected communities and the
chance for representation of the communities' interests. At the
same time, they engender feelings of disenfranchisement as well as
a loss of respect for our electoral system.
Since our political system is premised on the notion of repre-
sentative government, legislatures and courts should strive to ensure
that crafted districts will in fact result in representation of interests
of cohesive communities. However, the Court's current requirement
of proof of discriminatory effect in claims of political gerryman-
dering renders it impossible to successfully challenge such districts.
The result is the invariable degradation of cohesive community
interests as politicians divide communities and manipulate district
boundaries to ensure re-election. This division of communities into
gerrymandered districts results in the conscious disregard of the
interests of the members of the area by the elected representative.
These factors contribute to the decline in confidence in our
electoral system. Apathy increases as voters come rightly to believe
their votes do not make a difference in a system in which election
results are predetermined. To restore confidence in our political
system and increase voter enthusiasm for our government, it is
necessary that the electorate be able to successfully challenge polit-
ically gerrymandered districts.
Toward this end, the requirement of discriminatory effect
should be eliminated as an element in political gerrymandering
cases. Equal protection based racial and political gerrymandering
claims must be evaluated under the same standard. Until this is
accomplished, it will be impossible for true representation of indi-
vidual interests to occur. Residents of politically gerrymandered
districts will remain the victims of the practices of self-interested
politicians.
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